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According to Grotius in his Inleiding (2.36.6), the actual use of two houses by the 
same owner could lead to the implied grant of a servitude if he transferred one of the 
houses to someone else, ‘without any mention either the one way or the other’. Various 
interpretations of this text exist, but the consensus is lacking. In this article, the author 
investigates the meaning and influence of Grotius’s position on implied servitudes in 
both his time and the following centuries. This research shows how Grotius’s opinion 
progressed from Bartolus’s approach to implied servitudes and sheds new light on the 
creation of servitudes by means of destinatione patris familias in the Netherlands.
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Introduction
In his Inleiding tot de Hollandsche Rechts-geleerdheid (Introduction to Jurisprudence 
of Holland) (1631), Hugo de Groot discussed several different ways of creating 
servitudes. He remarked that a servitude could be created by agreement (toeze-
gging), followed by tolerance (’t gheheng), by will, and by prescription.1 He then 
1 Hugo de Groot, Inleiding tot de Hollandsche Rechts-geleertheyd (The Hague: Van Wou, 1631), 
2.36.2-4, p. 85.
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suggested that the creation of servitudes did not necessarily require an express 
agreement but that the following facts sufficed:
Zoo wanneer een vollen eigenaer van twee huizen het eene huis heeft ghe-
bruict met eenige gherechtigheid over het andere huis: ende daer nae door 
opdracht de huizen in eigendom werden gescheiden, zonder iet uit ofte in te 
zegghen, zoo behoud yeder huis zijne voordeelighe ende nadeelige gerech-
tigheden zulcs als te vooren.
So, when the full owner of two houses has used the one house with some 
entitlement to the other house, and afterwards the houses are divided 
in ownership by transfer, without any mention either the one way or the 
other, then each house will keep its advantageous and disadvantageous 
entitlements as before.2
According to Grotius, the actual use of one house in a servient way and the 
other house in a dominant way by the same owner had legal effects. It led to 
the creation of a servitude if the owner of both houses transferred one of the 
properties to someone else.
Van Leeuwen and Van der Keessel have argued that Grotius’s opinion was 
limited to cases where a servitude was previously lost by a merger (confusio).3 
A merger occurred when the owner of a dominant estate became the owner 
of the servient estate (and vice versa). According to Van Leeuwen and Van der 
Keessel, Grotius had meant that the former servitude revived if the owner of 
both houses transferred one of the houses to someone else. Groenewegen van 
der Made seems to have had the same interpretation of Grotius.4 Voet, how-
ever, suggested that Grotius’s position was comparable to the creation of ser-
vitudes by means of destinatione patris familias.5 This concept was developed 
by Bartolus and applied to cases where the owner of two estates used one of 
his estates in a servient way in favour of his other estate and transferred the 
2 Ibid., 2.36.6, p. 86.
3 S. van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis (Leiden: Luchtmans & Haak, 1741), 2.14.8, p. 127; D.G. van 
der Keessel, Voorlesinge oor die hedendaagse reg na aanleiding van De Groot se ‘Inleiding tot 
de Hollandse rechtsgeleerdheyd’ (translation of: Praelectiones juris hodierni ad Hugonis Grotii 
introductionem ad jurisprudentiam Hollandicam) (Amsterdam: Balkema, 1964), p. 157.
4 S. Groenewegen van der Made referred to Dig. 8.4.9 (Pomponius 10 ad Sabinum), Dig. 8.1.18 
(Paulus 31 quaestionum Papiniani) and Dig. 18.4.2.19 (Ulpianus 49 ad Sabinum) in: Hugo de 
Groot, Inleydinge tot de Hollandsche Regts-geleertheyt (with notes of Simon van Groenewegen 
van der Made) (Delft: Bon, 1657), p. 172. These texts dealt with cases where someone became 
the owner of both the dominant and servient estate and, subsequently, transferred one of 
these estates to someone else.
5 R. W. Lee, An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), p. 174.
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actually servient estate. According to Bartolus, this led to the implied grant 
of a servitude if its cause was continuous and permanent.6 Voet, however, 
did not elaborate on the extent of the similarity between Bartolus’s approach 
and that of Grotius’s. Voet rejected Grotius’s opinion by arguing that a seller 
could only create a servitude by reserving it expressly in the contract.7 At the 
end of the eighteenth century, Didericus Lulius, Pieter and Reinier van Spaan, 
and Joannes van der Linden discussed Grotius’s position. Still, they did not 
restrict it to the revival of lost servitudes or the creation of a servitude if its 
cause was continuous and permanent.8 In the South African case, Salmon v 
Lamb’s Executor & Naidoo (1906), judge Kotzé, however, remarked that it was 
the ‘generally-received interpretation’ that Grotius’s position only applied to 
the revival of servitudes after a merger.9
Not only is consensus on the interpretation of Grotius lacking, but it is 
also unclear what Grotius’s influence was on the recognition of implied ser-
vitudes in his time and the following centuries.10 Eighteenth-century Dutch 
legal scholars remarked that Grotius’s opinion was corroborated by the local 
laws of the Middelburg, Vlissingen, Schoonhoven, and Dordrecht.11 Moreover, 
the creation of servitudes by means of destinatione patris familias was eventu-
ally adopted in the French civil code of 1804 and the Dutch civil code of 1838. 
The development of implied servitudes in Italy, France, and other European 
6 See below § Bartolus on implied servitudes.
7 J. Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas (’s-Gravenhage: De Hondt, 1726), ad Dig. 19.1.6.
8 Dideric Lulius, Pieter van Spaan, Joannes van der Linden, Reinier van Spaan, 
Rechtsgeleerde Observatien, dienende tot opheldering van verscheiden duistere, en tot nog 
toe voor het grootste gedeelte onbeweezene passagien, uit de Inl. tot de Holl. Rechtsgel. van 
wylen Mr. Hugo de Groot, door een Genootschap van Rechtsgeleerden (Den Haag: Mensert, 
1778), derde deel, nr. 58, p. 164.
9 Salmon v Lamb’s Executor & Naidoo 1906 edc 364. However, Kotzé also questioned the 
prevailing opinion and argued that Grotius’s position could have applied to other cases. I will 
discuss Kotzé’s interpretation below in § Interpreting Grotius’s position on implied servitudes.
10 In South Africa, Voet’s approach to implied servitudes was followed. See Salmon v Lamb’s 
Executor & Naidoo 1906 edc 351; Lee, An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law, p. 174. Recently, 
Sonnekus suggested that Grotius had the reservation of a servitude in mind but made no 
mention of the restriction to servitudes with continuous and permanent cause. See J.C. 
Sonnekus, ‘Notariele Binding, Deeltitels en’n Erfdiensbaarheid om te Parkeer’, Tydskrif vir 
die Suid-Afrikaanse reg, 2017 (1), 2017, 116–37, p. 127: ‘Confusio kom dus nie ter sprake waar 
die eienaar vóór die afverkoop van een van die erwe ‘n diensbaarheid vir die heersende erf 
voorbehou en teen die titelakte van die dienende erf laat registreer saam met die oordrag 
van die eiendomsreg daarop aan ‘n ander nie. De Groot is daaroor uitdruklik’, subsequently 
citing Grotius’s Inleiding 2.36.6.
11 Lulius, et al., Rechtsgeleerde Observatien, derde deel, nr. 58, p. 164.
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countries12 has received ample scholarly attention, but this development in 
the Netherlands (and Grotius’s part in it) until the nineteenth-century civil 
codes remains a mystery.
In this article, I will investigate the meaning and influence of Grotius’s posi-
tion on implied servitudes in both his time and the following centuries. I will 
first discuss the Roman roots of Grotius’s remarks on the creation and merger 
of servitudes. Consecutively, I will analyse how Roman jurists and the medieval 
scholar Bartolus dealt with the implied grant of servitudes. I will then discuss 
how Bartolus has influenced early modern local laws and, after analysing the 
various interpretations of Grotius’s position on implied servitudes, argue that 
Grotius progressed from Bartolus’s approach to implied servitudes. Finally, 
Grotius’s influence on the recognition of implied servitudes in the Netherlands 
will be investigated, both in his time and the following centuries.
The (re)creation and Merger of Servitudes in Roman Law
Grotius’s standard ways of creating servitudes – agreement (toezegging), fol-
lowed by tolerance (’t gheheng), will, and prescription – clearly echoed Roman 
law.13 In the Institutes, emperor Justinian expressly mentioned that servitudes 
were created by will or informal agreements and stipulations.14 Moreover, the 
12 For example: F. Lafargue, La servitude par destination du pe﻿̀re de famille (Bordeaux: Delmas, 
1937); V. Simoncelli, La destinazione del padre di famiglia come titolo costitutivo di servitù 
prediali (Napoli: Luigi Pierro, 1886); J.B. Correa-Calderon, ‘La destination du père de 
famille dans le droit français et étranger’, Rev. Notariat, 53 (1951), 572–84; P. Ourliac en J. de 
Malafosse, Histoire du droit privé, Les biens (Parijs: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961), p. 
389; M.G. Zoz, La costituzione tacita delle servitù nell’esperienza giuridica romana (Milano: 
Giufrè, 2001), pp. 141–56. The implied creation of servitudes is also recognised in Louisiana: 
‘Louisiana Civil Code – Code Civil de Louisiane’ (2015), Book ii, 8 J. Civ. L. Stud. 493. Cf. 
A. N. Yiannopoulos, ‘Creation of Servitudes by Prescription and Destination of the Owner’, 
Louisiana Law Review, 43(1), 1982, 57–83.
13 De Groot, Inleiding tot de Hollandsche Rechts-geleertheyd, 2.36.2-4, p. 85.
14 Inst. 2.3.4. See also B. Biondi. Le servitù prediali nel diritto romano (Milano: Giuffrè, 1969), pp. 
262–4; G. Grosso, Le servitù prediali nel diritto romano (Turin: Giappichelli, 1969), pp. 226–30; 
M. Kaser, Das Römische Privatrecht. Zweiter Abschnitt. Die Nachklassischen Entwicklungen 
(München: C.H. Beck, 1975), p. 300 (§246). In classical Roman law, the creation by informal 
agreements and stipulations was restricted to servitudes on provincial land. See: Gai. inst. 
2.29–31. See also Biondi, Le servitù prediali nel diritto romano, pp. 248–62; Grosso, Le servitù 
prediali nel diritto romano, pp. 192–203; Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht. Erster Abschnitt: Das 
altrömische, das vorklassische und klassische Recht (München: C.H. Beck, 1971), p. 443 (§105). 
Texts contained in the Digest show that servitudes could be the result of an adiudicatio 
under the actions familiae erciscundae and communi dividundo. For example: Dig. 10.2.22.3 
(Ulpianus 19 ad edictum); Dig. 7.1.6.1 (Gaius 7 ad edictum provinciale). See also Biondi, Le 
servitù prediali nel diritto romano, p. 237; Grosso, Le servitù prediali nel diritto romano, p. 192; 
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prescription of servitudes by means of praescriptio longi temporis was recog-
nised.15 The jurist Ulpian also mentioned the (praetorian) protection of some-
one who was simply granted access to land by its owner and who was tolerated 
to use the land in a servient way,16 and of someone who enjoyed the long use 
and quasi-possessio of a servitude.17
The glossators and commentators were reluctant to accept that servitudes 
could be created by mere informal agreements and stipulations. They argued 
that a quasi traditio was required, ‘such as by means of tolerance’ (ut per 
patientiam).18 This requirement was in accordance with their position on the 
requirements for a transfer of ownership. They considered C. 2.3.20 to be the 
general rule, which required a traditio for the transfer of ownership.19 Despite 
the fact that Grotius had argued from a natural law perspective that a transfer 
of ownership required no delivery,20 he did consider tolerance (‘t gheheng) to 
be required for the creation of servitudes.
Grotius was unwilling to recognise the requirement of a quasi-delivery 
before a local court. According to Grotius in one of his legal opinions, the 
imperial decree that required that transfers of immovables be passed before a 
local court did not apply to the creation of servitudes, since servitudes did not 
qualify as transfers (servitutis imposition non comprehenditur sub alienatione).21 
Dig. 7.1.6.1 (Gaius 7 ad edictum provinciale) concerned a right of usufruct but Gaius stated 
that servitudes were created in the same way as rights of usufruct. See: Dig. 8.1.5 pr (Gaius 7 
ad edictum provinciale).
15 See also Biondi, Le servitù prediali nel diritto romano, p. 284; Grosso, Le servitù prediali nel 
diritto romano, pp. 219–20. The opinions contained in the Digest, however, expressed some 
different views as to whether servitudes could be created by prescription. For example: Dig. 
41.3.4.28(29) (Paulus 54 ad edictum); Dig. 8.1.14 pr (Paulus 15 ad edictum). These differences 
can be explained by the fact that prescription was not unequivocally accepted in classical 
Roman law. Cf. Grosso, Le servitù prediali nel diritto romano, p. 189.
16 Dig. 8.3.1.2 (Ulpianus 2 institutionum) and 8.3.13. See also Biondi, Le servitù prediali nel diritto 
romano, pp. 246 and 265–73; Grosso, Le servitù prediali nel diritto romano, p. 209.
17 Dig. 8.5.10 pr (Ulpianus 53 ad edictum). Cf. Grosso, Le servitù prediali nel diritto romano, p. 218.
18 For example: Glosse traditionem apud Dig. 41.1.43.1 (Gaius 7 ad edictum provinciale) 
incorporales. Cf. Nicasius de Voerda, Enarrationes in quatuor libros Institutionum (Lyon: Paul 
Miraillet, 1549), ad Inst. 2.3.4, fol. 111 recto; Julius Pacius de Beriga, Analysis ad Instituta (Leiden: 
Abraham Geervliet, 1649), ad Inst. 2.3.4, p. 32; Arnold Vinnius, In quattor libros institutionum 
imperialium commentarius (Lyon: De Tournes, 1767), tomus primus, ad Inst. 2.3.4, p. 240.
19 Cf. E.J.H. Schrage, ‘Traditionibus et usucapionibus, non nudis pactis dominia rerum 
transderuntur’, in: Ins Wasser geworfen und Ozeane durchquert, Festschrift für Knut Wolfgang 
Nörr, ed. by M. Ascheri (Köln: Böhlau, 2003), pp. 921–3.
20 Hugo de Groot, Inleydinge tot de Hollandsche Regts-geleertheyt (with notes of Simon van 
Groenewegen van der Made) (Delft: Bon, 1657), 2.5.2. See also Schrage, ‘Traditionibus et 
usucapionibus, non nudis pactis dominia rerum transderuntur’, pp. 944–6.
21 Consultatien, advisen en advertissementen, gegeven en geschreven by verscheyden treffelijcke 
rechtsgeleerden in Holland en elders (Rotterdam: Naeranus, 1662), iii, nr. 216, p. 564.
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Voet agreed with Grotius that servitudes were created by agreement and qua-
si-delivery, ‘which consists in use and sufferance or in the pointing out of a 
spot for the exercise of the servitude’, but rejected the notion that local cus-
toms required no quasi-delivery before the local court.22 Groenewegen van der 
Made, Van Leeuwen, and Van der Keessel were of the same opinion.23
In the Digest, a frequently mentioned way to create a servitude was the res-
ervation of a servitude when an estate was transferred. The transferor could 
encumber the transferred ‘servient’ estate by reserving a servitude in favour of 
his own ‘dominant’ estate at the moment of the transfer. Julian stated:
A man who has two tracts of vacant ground can, on the conveyance of 
one of them, impose a servitude on it in favour of the other.24
Some texts suggest that this reservation was made in the contract for the trans-
fer, whereas other texts suggest that it was made at the moment of the trans-
fer.25 Marcian argued that a transferor could compel the transferee to create 
a servitude if the parties had agreed upon the creation of a servitude in the 
sale and the transferor had forgotten to reserve the servitude at the moment 
of transfer.26 In classical Roman law, a reservation of a servitude was imple-
mented in the required formal declaration for a mancipatio or in iure cessio.27 
In Justinian law, it would not have mattered if the parties agreed on the reser-
vation of a servitude in the contract or at the moment the property was deliv-
ered. Justinian law required a iusta causa and a delivery (traditio) in order for 
a transfer of ownership to take place. If the parties had agreed in the contract 
22 Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, ad 8.4.1.
23 Groenewegen van der Made in: Hugo de Groot, Inleydinge tot de Hollandsche Regts-
geleertheyt (with notes of Simon van Groenewegen van der Made) (Delft: Bon, 1657), p. 
171; Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, ad 8.4.1; S. van Leeuwen, Het Rooms-Hollands regt 
(Leiden: Hackens, 1664), 2.19.2, p. 168, Van der Keessel, Voorlesinge oor die hedendaagse reg, 
p. 153. See also Lee, An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law, p. 169; C.P. Joubert, ‘Die vestiging 
van serwitute op informele wyse deur quasi traditio’, Journal for Contemporary Roman-Dutch 
Law 22 (3), 1959, 157–96.
24 Dig. 8.2.34 (Julianus 2 ex Minicio): ‘Et qui duas areas habet, alteram tradendo servam alteri 
efficere potest.’
25 In the contract: Dig. 8.4.5 (Iavolenus 2 epistolarum); Dig. 8.4.6.3a (Ulpianus 28 ad Sabinum). 
At the moment of transfer: Dig. 8.2.35 (Marcianus 3 regularum); Dig. 8.4.3 (Gaius 7 ad edictum 
provinciale); Dig. 8.4.6 pr (Ulpianus 28 ad Sabinum); Dig. 8.4.7 pr (Paulus 5 ad Sabinum); Dig. 
8.5.10 pr (Ulpianus 53 ad edictum).
26 Dig. 8.2.35 (Marcianus 3 regularum).
27 Gai. inst. 2.29–31. See also Biondi. Le servitù prediali nel diritto romano, p. 222; Grosso, Le 
servitù prediali nel diritto romano, p. 187; Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht. Erster Abschnitt, p. 
444 (§105).
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that the transferor could reserve a servitude, then the transferee only received 
ownership encumbered by a servitude at the moment the property was deliv-
ered.28 If the parties agreed on the reservation of the servitude at the moment 
of delivery, the agreement could be seen as an amendment to the iusta causa.
A transferor could not only create a servitude when transferring a ‘servient’ 
estate, but he could also encumber his own estate in favour of the transferred 
estate.29 However, he could not create a servitude on one estate in favour of 
another estate if he transferred both estates at the same time.30
Grotius did not explicitly discuss the reservation of a servitude as a way 
to create servitudes. Perhaps 2.36.6 concerned the reservation of a servitude 
when transferring ownership of an immovable property, perhaps not. I will 
come back to that later. Grotius remarked that a right of servitude could not 
exist if someone were the owner of both a dominant and a servient estate.31 In 
Roman law, a right of servitude was lost when one person became the owner 
of both the dominant and servient estate. The Roman jurist Gaius (c. 110–80 
ce) remarked:
Praedial servitudes are extinguished by merger if the same person be-
comes owner of both estates.32
Roman jurists used the legal maxim nulli res sua servit (one’s own property 
serves no one) to justify the loss of the servitude.33 The idea seems to have 
been that an owner already had all powers in the property, and a servitude 
would have been superfluous.34 The jurists did express this notion with regard 
to servitudes, but Ulpian wrote the following about a right of usufruct:
28 See also Biondi. Le servitù prediali nel diritto romano, p. 225.
29 Dig. 8.4.3 (Gaius 7 ad edictum provinciale); Dig. 8.4.6.pr (Ulpianus 28 ad Sabinum).
30 Dig. 8.4.6 pr (Ulpianus 28 ad Sabinum).
31 De Groot, Inleiding tot de Hollandsche Rechts-geleertheyd, 2.37.1, p. 86.
32 Dig. 8.6.1 (Gaius 7 ad edictum provinciale): ‘Servitutes praediorum confunduntur, si idem 
utriusque praedii dominus esse coeperit.’ The translation used for the texts of the Digest: 
Alan Watson (ed.), The Digest of Justinian (Philadelphia: Penn Press, 1998). Servitudes were 
not lost when the owner of a dominant estate became the owner of just one of multiple 
servient estates. See: Dig. 8.3.31 (Julianus 2 ex Minicio); Dig. 8.6.15 (Javolenus 2 epistularum). 
This was because the jurists regarded a servitude as one right, even if it encumbered 
multiple servient estates. Dig. 8.3.18 (Ulpianus 14 ad Sabinum). See also P. Kieß, Die confusio 
im klassischen römischen Recht (Berlijn: Duncker & Humblot, 1995), p. 39. Servitudes also 
survived when the owner of a dominant estate acquired co-ownership of a servient estate. 
Dig. 8.3.34 pr; 8.3.27; 8.2.30.1. See also Kieß, Die confusio im klassischen römischen Recht, p. 40.
33 Dig. 8.2.26 (Paulus 15 ad Sabinum); Dig. 8.3.33.1 (Africanus 9 questionum).
34 Biondi, Le servitù prediali nel diritto romano, p. 104; Grosso, Le servitù prediali nel diritto 
romano, p. 89; Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht. Erster Abschnitt, p. 443 (§105); Kieß, Die 
confusio im klassischen römischen Recht, p. 191.
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The only person who can claim at law that he has the right to use and 
enjoy property is the man who has the usufruct of it. The owner of the 
estate cannot do so, as a man who has the ownership does not have a 
separate right of use and enjoyment; the fact is that a man’s estate cannot 
be subject to a servitude in his own favour (…).35
Roman jurists considered a usufruct a personal servitude and put it often on 
par with real servitudes.36 Therefore, it is likely that Ulpian’s explanation for 
usufruct also applies to the maxim nulli res sua servit.37
Servitudes that were lost by a merger did not revive automatically if the 
owner of two estates transferred a former dominant or a servient estate to 
someone else. The jurist Paul advised parties to create a new servitude at the 
moment of transfer of one of the estates if they desired the recreation of a lost 
servitude:
If a man acquires a house by conveyance after purchasing it, and the 
house is burdened with a servitude in favour of another house of his, the 
servitude is extinguished by merger. Should he want to resell the house, 
the servitude must be expressly recreated, otherwise the house will be 
sold free of it.38
As mentioned earlier, the transferor could reserve a servitude. The jurists rec-
ognised the legal obligation to create a new servitude in cases where a merger 
was triggered by the law of succession. If the owner of a dominant estate inher-
ited the servient estate, the servitude was lost by merger. In some cases, the 
heir would be obligated to transfer parts of the inheritance to the beneficiary 
of a legacy (per damnationem). If the heir needed to transfer an estate that had 
been encumbered with a servitude in favour of the heir’s estate before the death 
of the testator, the beneficiary had to tolerate the creation of a new servitude.39 
35 Dig. 7.6.5 pr (Ulpianus 17 ad edictum): ‘Uti frui ius sibi esse solus potest intendere, qui habet 
usum fructum, dominus autem fundi non potest, quia qui habet proprietatem, utendi 
fruendi ius separatum non habet: nec enim potest ei suus fundus servire.‘
36 Dig. 8.1.1 (Marcianus 3 regularum). For example, Gaius wrote in Dig. 8.1.5 pr (Gaius 7 ad 
edictum provinciale) that what he had written on the creation of a right of usufruct also 
applied to the creation of a right of servitude.
37 Biondi, Le servitù prediali nel diritto romano, p. 223; Grosso, Le servitù prediali nel diritto 
romano, p. 89.
38 Dig. 8.2.30 (Paulus 15 ad Sabinum): ‘Si quis aedes, quae suis aedibus servirent, cum emisset 
traditas sibi accepit, confusa sublataque servitus est, et si rursus vendere vult, nominatim 
imponenda servitus est: alioquin liberae veniunt.’
39 Dig. 8.1.18 (Paulus 31 quaestionum).
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The heir was allowed to reserve a servitude when he transferred the former ser-
vient estate to the beneficiary.40 On the contrary situation, where the merger 
had extinguished the servitude, and the beneficiary was entitled to a dominant 
estate, the heir was required to create a new servitude in his former servient 
estate.41 Reviving lost servitudes was not only required in cases where an heir 
transferred former servient or dominant estates, but also in cases where the 
heir transferred the complete inheritance. Pomponius stated:
If I become heir to a man whose estate was servient to mine and I then 
sell the inheritance to you, the servitude ought to be re-established, to 
exist as it did formerly, because the understanding is that you are consid-
ered as if you actually were the heir of the deceased.42
Re-establishing or reviving the servitude meant that the heir and purchaser of 
the inheritance needed to create a new servitude.43
The Implied Grant of Servitudes in Roman Law
The main rule was that servitudes needed to be created by express agreement.44 
In Dig. 18.1.66 pr (Pomponius 31 ad Quintum Mucium), Pomponius stated:
When land is sold, certain obligations are due, even if not stated, such as 
that the purchaser shall not be evicted from the land or the usufruct of it. 
Other obligations are due only if made express, such as that the rights of 
way and of drawing water will be forthcoming; the same is true of urban 
servitudes.45
40 Dig. 30.70.1 (Gaius 18 ad edictum provincial). See also Kieß, Die confusio im klassischen 
römischen Recht, p. 54.
41 Dig. 30.116.4 (Florentinus 11 institutionum). See also Kieß, idem, p. 53.
42 Dig. 8.4.9 (Pomponius 10 ad Sabinum): ‘Si ei, cuius praedium mihi serviebat, heres exstiti et 
eam hereditatem tibi vendidi, restitui in pristinum statum servitus debet, quia id agitur, ut 
quasi tu heres videaris exstitisse.‘
43 Dig. 18.4.2.19 (Ulpianus 49 ad Sabinum). See also D. Daube, ‘Sale of inheritance and merger of 
rights’, in: Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Romanistische Abtheilung, ed. 
by M. Kasser, W. Kunkel, et al., vol. 74 (Weimer: Verlag Hermann Bohlaus, 1957), pp. 234–315 
(p. 274); Kieß, Die confusio im klassischen römischen Recht, p. 47.
44 Dig. 8.4.7 pr (Paulus 5 ad Sabinum); Dig. 8.4.10 (Ulpianus 10 ad Sabinum).
45 ‘In vendendo fundo quaedam etiam si non dicantur, praestanda sunt, veluti ne fundus 
evincatur aut usus fructus eius, quaedam ita demum, si dicta sint, veluti viam iter actum 
aquae ductum praestatu iri: idem et in servitutibus urbanorum praediorum.’
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According to Paul, it was insufficient for a transferor to state that an estate was 
encumbered with a servitude generally.46 The express reservation needed to 
be more specific.
Roman law recognised the implied grant of servitudes in specific cases. It 
concerned cases where the owner of two estates used one of his estates in a 
servient way in favour of his other estate. Because of the rules on a merger, no 
servitude could exist. If the owner transferred the actually servient estate to 
someone else, the transfer sometimes led to the creation of a servitude. A very 
influential text on this matter during the reception of Roman law was Dig. 33.3.1 
(Julianus 1 ex Minicio). Julian discussed a case where the owner of two con-
nected shops bequeathed the shops to two different beneficiaries. One shop 
supported the other shop. The question was raised if the beneficiary should 
tolerate his shop supporting the other shop. Julian thought so and added:
(..) Let us see whether this is true only if either this servitude is specifically 
imposed or the legacy is given in the form: ‘I give and legate my shop as 
it now is.’47
According to Julian, the heir was not required to reserve the servitude expressly 
in his will. The interpretation of the will led to the implied grant of the servi-
tude.48 Roman jurists even recognised the creation of servitudes in cases where 
nothing had been said on the matter. Ulpian discussed the following case:
If the seller of a farm specifies that a burial place should be available for 
him and his descendants to be buried there, if he is denied access for the 
purpose of carrying someone for burial, then he can bring an action. For 
the agreement between the purchaser and the seller is held to guarantee 
right of way through the farm for the purpose of performing a burial.49
Ulpian’s interpretation of the reservation of the burial place meant that the 
seller had to have the right of way to get there after the transfer of the estate. 
46 Dig. 8.4.7 pr (Paulus 5 ad Sabinum).
47 Dig. 33.3.1 (Julianus 1 ex Minicio): ‘’(…) videamus, ne hoc ita verum sit, si aut nominatim haec 
servitus imposita est aut ita legatum datum est: ‘Tabernam meam uti nunc est do lego’.’’
48 See also Simoncelli, La destinazione del padre di famiglia, p. 22; Biondi, Le servitù prediali nel 
diritto romano, p. 294; Zoz, La costituzione tacita delle servitù, p. 38–44.
49 Dig. 11.7.10 (Ulpianus 25 ad edictum): ‘Si venditor fundi exceperit locum sepulchri ad hoc, ut 
ipse posterique eius illo inferrentur, si via uti prohibeatur, ut mortuum suum inferret, agere 
potest: videtur enim etiam hoc exceptum inter ementem et vendentem, ut ei per fundum 
sepulturae causa ire liceret.’
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Marcellus discussed a similar case in Dig. 8.2.10 (Marcellus 4 digestorum). 
The owner of two houses (binas aedes) bequeathed one of the houses. The 
bequeathed house could only be accessed through the house of the heir. The 
question was put to Marcellus if the heir was required to create a servitude 
to provide access to the legatee’s property. Marcellus answered in the affirm-
ative and stated that the legacy would be useless without access to the prop-
erty. Interpretation of the legacy meant that the creation of a servitude was 
required.50
Papinian discussed a case where the owner bequeathed two houses with 
a common roof to two different beneficiaries.51 According to Papinian, both 
beneficiaries had to tolerate that the non-common beams of each of the bene-
ficiaries were inserted into each other’s walls. This advice suggests the implied 
grant of a servitude.52 However, there is a different explanation to this advice 
if we consider this advice in conjunction with a case discussed by Javolen. A 
testator had bequeathed two houses with a common roof to two different ben-
eficiaries, as in the case discussed by Papinian. Javolen stated that both ben-
eficiaries could not bring actions against each other to prevent each other’s 
beams sticking in the wall, since it was a common wall: ‘(…) for it is agreed 
that if a partner owns something jointly, he has all the rights pertaining to it, 
and so an arbitrator for dividing common property must be appointed in the 
matter.’53 The rejection of the actions was based on the fact that the parties 
were co-owner of the wall. They were not entitled to institute such action indi-
vidually but only together.54
In short, the implied grant of servitudes was not easily accepted in Roman 
law. A transferor could expressly reserve a servitude when he transferred an 
estate to someone else. The interpretation of the iusta causa for the transfer 
could lead to the implied grant of servitudes, especially where servitude was 
essential to one of the estates.55
50 Cf. Dig. 7.6.1.1 (Ulpianus 18 ad Sabinum). See also Biondi, Le servitù prediali nel diritto romano, 
p. 297.
51 Dig. 8.2.36 (Papinianus 7 quaestionum).
52 See also Simoncelli, La destinazione del padre di famiglia, p. 24; Zoz, La costituzione tacita 
delle servitù, p. 88–9.
53 Dig. 33.3.4 (Iavolenus 9 epistolarum): ‘(…) nam quod communiter socius habet, et in iure 
eum habere constitit: itaque de ea re arbiter communi dividundo sumendus est.’
54 See also Simoncelli, La destinazione del padre di famiglia, p. 27; Zoz, La costituzione tacita 
delle servitù, p. 93.
55 See also V. Simoncelli, idem, p. 37; M.G. Zoz, idem, p. 22.
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Bartolus on Implied Servitudes
Medieval jurists were reluctant to accept the implied grant of servitudes. The 
glossa ordinaria considered the abovementioned text Dig. 18.1.66 (Pomponius 
31 ad Quintum Mucium) in vendendo to be the general rule. If parties wanted 
to create a servitude, they had to agree so expressly.56 If a servitude was not 
explicitly mentioned, the jurists were only willing to accept a wide interpre-
tation of legacies and not contracts.57 The outcome of Dig. 8.2.10 (Marcellus 4 
digestorum) binas aedes was considered an example of a wide interpretation of 
a will. In that specific case, the interpretation of a legacy led to the creation of a 
servitude that was necessary to gain entry to the bequeathed estate.
Bartolus (1313 – 57) stated that a seller who wanted to reserve a servitude in 
the sold property needed to do so expressly in the contract. He wrote: ‘Whoever 
wants to create a servitude must create her expressly.’58 However, he was less 
reluctant than his contemporaries in accepting implied servitudes if parties 
had made no mention of any servitudes. Bartolus forwarded his approach in 
his comments on Dig. 33.3.1 (Julianus 1 ex Minicio) duas tabernas. In this afore-
mentioned text, Julian accepted an implied servitude in the case where the 
owner of two connected shops bequeathed one ‘servient’ shop to one benefi-
ciary and one ‘dominant’ shop to another beneficiary. According to Bartolus, a 
servitude was implied if there was doubt about the meaning of the parties and 
the servitude had a continuous and permanent cause (causam continuam et 
permanentem).59
56 Glosse Quaeri apud Dig. 8.2.10 (Marcellus 4 digestorum) Binas aedes; Angelus de Perusio, 
Lectura super prima parte Digesti Veteris (Lyon: de Moylin, 1534), ad Dig. 8.2.10 (Marcellus 4 
digestorum) Binas Aedes, 185 verso.
57 Angelus de Perusio, Lectura super prima parte Digesti Veteris, ad Dig. 8.2.10 (Marcellus 4 
digestorum) Binas Aedes, 185 verso.; Paulus de Castro, In primam digesti veteris partem 
commentaria (Lyon: Ant. Blanc, 1583), ad Dig. 8.2.10 (Marcellus 4 digestorum) Binas Aedes, 
221 verso; Bartolomeo Cepolla, Urb. Praedior. Tract. I, cap. 38, nr. iv, in: Trattato delle servitù 
prediali sì urbane che rustiche di Bartolomeo Cipolla, ed. by Ciriani and De Vergottini (Venezia: 
Naratovich, 1859), p. 339.
58 Ad Dig. 8.4.7 pr (Paulus 5 ad Sabinum): ‘Qui vult servitutem excipere, debet eam certam 
excipere.’
59 Bartolus ad Dig. 33.3.1: ‘Si domus una sustineat actum servitutis habentis causam continuam 
et permanentem, et alienetur in dubio servitus videtur imposita. (…) & idem crederem in 
venditione domus, ut videatur imposita servitus, ut sustineat onera permanentia, quae ipso 
actu sustinebat, maxime si contrahentes hoc sciebant.’ Accursius added the word tacite 
when he discussed Dig. 33.3.1 (Julianus 1 ex Minicio). This was his way to indicate that the 
servitude was created tacitly.
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If one house sustains a state of servitude which has a continuous and 
permanent cause and it (i.e. the house) is alienated, (then) the estab-
lished servitude seems in doubt (…) and I believe the same for the sale of 
a house, that a servitude seems established, so that it (i.e. the house) bear 
permanent burdens which it already sustained, especially if the contract-
ing parties knew.
Bartolus’s approach is a matter of interpretation of the title (iusta causa) for 
the transfer of ownership. Parties were free to agree on what happened to 
actual servitudes after a transfer. If they made no arrangements or if the par-
ties’ meaning was unclear, Bartolus was inclined to accept the implied grant 
of a servitude. According to Bartolus, recognising a servitude was even more 
obvious in cases where an owner transferred an actually servient estate. Both 
he and the transferee were aware of this actual servitude (maxime si contra-
hentes hoc sciebant).
The requirement that the servitude had a continuous and permanent cause 
protected a transferee, as they entailed some kind of publicity. Examples of 
servitudes with a continuous and permanent cause were the right to suffer 
that the beams of a neighbouring estate were inserted into someone else’s wall 
or the right to suffer that a shop supported someone else’s shop. Bartolus also 
mentioned some servitudes which did not meet the requirements, such as a 
right of way. A right of way was not exercised continuously, but only each time 
someone walked there. Such servitudes still needed to be created expressly.
Bartolus’s interpretation of the implied grant of servitudes was influen-
tial in the following centuries. For example, Bartolomeo Cepolla adopted 
Bartolus’s approach in his fifteenth-century monograph on servitudes.60 Two 
cases brought before the Sacrum Consilium of Naples also echoed Bartolus’s 
approach. In one case, the owner of two houses sold one of them ‘free and 
unencumbered by any servitude’ (liberam et expeditam ab omni servitute), 
except for a specific servitude regarding windows overlooking the garden of 
the house. The seller made no mention of any other servitudes at the moment 
of the transfer. After the transfer, the seller claimed there were also implied 
servitudes regarding other windows and the drainage of water. He argued 
that these servitudes had a permanent cause, that he and the purchaser had 
seen these servitudes and they had been aware of them at the moment of the 
transfer (viderant & sciverant). The purchaser contested the servitudes and 
argued that only the expressly mentioned servitudes were created. The Sacrum 
60 Bartolomeo Cepolla, Urb. Praedior. Tract I, cap. 38, nr. vi,in: Trattato delle servitù prediali sì 
urbane che rustiche di Bartolomeo Cipolla, p. 340.
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Consilium ruled that only the expressly mentioned servitudes were created, 
since the contract stipulated that the house and garden were free of servitudes, 
except for the specifically mentioned servitudes.61
In another case, the Sacrum Consilium discussed how Bartolus left room for 
the recognition of a servitude, even if the parties were unaware of the servi-
tude.62 The Consilium considered that a bit harsh, especially if the purchaser 
would not have paid the same price for the land had he been aware of the ser-
vitude. The Consilium recognised the existence of a servitude but decided that 
the purchaser had paid too much for the land.63 Simoncelli has pointed out 
that other contemporary sources required that implied servitudes not only had 
a continuous and permanent cause but that they needed to be visible too.64
Bartolus’s Influence on Early Modern Local Laws
Bartolus’s approach has been influential in a large number of countries, 
including France.65 The middle and the southern parts of France, the so-called 
‘pays de droit écrit’, recognised the (written) Roman law as its customary law. 
Its interpretation by medieval legal scholars, such as Bartolus, influenced the 
law directly. Bartolus’s approach to implied servitudes was adopted, and this 
meant that the transfer of an actually servient estate led to the implied grant of 
a servitude if its cause was continuous and permanent.66 This implied grant of 
servitudes became known as the destination du pe﻿̀re de famille (designated use 
by the head of the family).67 The written customary law of Paris, the Coutume 
61 M. de Afflictis, Decisiones sacri Consilii Neapolitani (Venice: Dominicus Lilius, 1557), dec. 298, 
p. 237 verso.
62 A. Capycius, Decisiones sacri regii Consilii Neapolitani (Venice: Andrea Pellegrini, 1603), dec. 
187, p. 515.
63 See also Simoncelli, La destinazione del padre di famiglia, p. 57.
64 Simoncelli, La destinazione del padre di famiglia, p. 58.
65 For example: Lafargue, La servitude par destination du pe﻿̀re de famille; Simoncelli, La 
destinazione del padre di famiglia Correa-Calderon, ‘La destination du père de famille’, pp. 
572–84; Ourliac and de Malafosse, Histoire du droit privé, p. 389; Zoz, La costituzione tacita 
delle servitù, pp. 141–56. The implied creation of servitudes is also recognised in Louisiana: 
‘Louisiana Civil Code – Code Civil de Louisiane’ (2015), Book ii, 8 J. Civ. L. Stud. 493. Cf. 
A. N. Yiannopoulos, ‘Creation of Servitudes by Prescription and Destination of the Owner’, 
Louisiana Law Review, 43(1), 1982, 57–83.
66 Ourliac and de Malafosse, Histoire du droit privé, p. 389.
67 Bartolus mentioned the fundus constituitur destinatione patris familias [Ad Dig. 30.24.2 
(Pomponius 5 ad Sabinum) Si quis post] to interpret a legacy in a will but did not use this 
terminology when discussing the implied grant of servitudes. Cf. S. Randazzo, ‘‘Servitus ‘iure’ 
imposita: ‘Destinazione del padre di famiglia’ e costituzione ‘ipso iure’ della servitù’, Rivista 
di diritto Romano, ii (2002), 279–304.
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de Paris of 1510, also recognised the destination du pe﻿̀re de famille.68 Since a 
iusta causa was required for the creation of servitudes, article 91 provided: 
Destination du pe﻿̀re de famille vaut titre (designated use by the head of the fam-
ily equals title).69 According to Pothier, the rationale behind this provision (in 
Orléans) was that someone acquired the servient estate ‘as is, where is’.70 It 
remains unclear whether or not this rule applied to all types of servitudes or 
just servitudes with a continuous and permanent cause.71 From 1580 onwards, 
a transferor needed to provide written evidence to prove that his former estate 
had been an actually servient estate. He could provide, for example, a written 
contract with a contractor, receipts from a construction worker or a deed with 
a description of the estate before the transfer.72
Bartolus’s approach also had an impact in the Low Countries. Antwerp’s 
compilation of customary law of 1582, the so-called Consuetudines impressae 
contained an elaborate provision on the implied grant of servitudes.73
Title lxii, Van erf-scheydinge, servituten ende des daer aen cleeft, 
article 14:
And so when the owner of two houses or estates sells just one of them 
or part of it, or with land and its accessories, or just as he had possessed 
or used it, or with similar words, the watercourses, passages, lavatories, 
lights (waterloopen, doorgangen, weerdribben, lichtscheppinghen) and 
other servitudes or benefits, serving both houses respectively, should stay 
68 See also Simoncelli, La destinazione del padre di famiglia, p. 72.
69 Art. 216 Coutume de Paris; Art. 228 Coutume d’Orléans.
70 Coutume des Duché, Bailliage en Prévôté d’Orléans (with remarks by Pothier) (Paris: Rouzeau-
Montaut, 1780), p. 398.
71 P. A. Fenet, Recueil complet des travaux préparatoires du Code civil (Paris: Videcoq, 1836), xi, 
p. 327.
72 Art. 216 Coutume de Paris (and art. 228 Coutume d’Orléans): ‘Destination du père de famille 
vaut titre, quand elle est, ou été par ecrit, & non autrement.’ The agreement no longer had 
to be in writing after the revision of the Coutume de Paris in 1580. See also Desgodets/Goupy, 
Les Loix des bâtimens, suivant la coutume de Paris (Paris, 1748), p. 418. The French legislator 
of 1804 combined the different French approaches to the destination du pe﻿̀re de famille in 
article 692 of the Code civil: The designated use by the head of the family equals a title for 
continuous and visible servitudes (‘La destination du père de famille vaut titre à l’égard des 
servitudes continues et apparentes’). If someone transferred an estate with a visible sign of a 
servitude (‘un signe apparent de servitude’) a servitude would be implied, even if the parties 
had made no mention of servitudes (art. 694 Cc).
73 Url: https://www.kuleuven-kulak.be/facult/rechten/Monballyu/Rechtlagelanden/
Brabantsrecht/antwerpen/impressa2.html. See for the differences between the Antwerp 
restatements of law: B. van Hofstraeten, Juridisch Humanisme en Costumiere Acculturatie 
(Maastricht: up Maastricht, 2008), pp. 7–11.
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the same as they were before or at the time of the division and sale. And 
they will be considered to be created tacitly in this case, unless the parties 
agree otherwise.74
Antwerp’s Consuetudines compilatae of 1608 had a similar provision.75 The 
Antwerp provisions seem to have been the inspiration for the Middelburg 
Ordinance of December 19th 1617,76 and the Flushing (Vlissingen) Ordinance 
of March 11th 1628. The latter says:
And so when the owner of two houses and estates sells just one of them 
or part of it, or with land and with all the appurtenances, just as (or with 
such liberties and servitudes) he had possessed or used it, or with similar 
clauses and words, the watercourses, passages, lights (Water-loopen, Door-
ganghen, Licht-scheppinghen) and other such uses or benefits should stay, 
and shall be used, in the same way as they were before and at the time of 
the division and sale. And they will be considered to be created tacitly in 
this case, unless the parties agree otherwise. The same applies in the case 
where two houses are divided, simply, or with the aforementioned words, 
between the heirs or successors of the possessor.77
The approach taken by the cities of Antwerp, Middelburg, and Vlissingen 
meant that a purchaser could acquire an encumbered estate even if he was 
unaware of a servitude. Just as in Bartolus’s approach, this was a matter of 
interpretation. Interpretation of the clause ‘just as the seller had possessed or 
74 14. ‘Ende so wanneer de Proprietaris van twee huysen oft erven een van dien oft een deel 
daeraf vercoopt simpliciter, oft met gronde ende toebehoorten, oft ghelijck een sulck dat 
beseten oft ghebruyct heeft, oft dierghelijckewoorden, moeten de waterloopen, doorgangen, 
weerdribben, lichtscheppinghen ende andere servituten oft commoditeyten, beyde de 
huysen respecti-velijck dienende, blyven ghelijcse voor oft ten tijde vande splijtinghe ende 
vercoopinge geweest hebben: ende worden in sulcken cas verstaen tacite geconstitueert te 
sijn, t’en ware dat daer in anders by partijen ware versien’.
75 Deel iii, Titel v, Van gebuerelijcke rechten ende servitueten, § 8. Servituten van huijsen. 90. 
‘Item, als den eijgenaer van twee huijsen oft erven een van dijen, oft deel daeraff simpelijck 
vercoopt oft in (2) alle sijne gronden ende toebehoorten, oft gelijck eenen sulckenen 
dat beseten oft gebruijckt heeft, oft diergelijcke woorden, moeten de waterloopen, 
doorgangen, wederribben, lichtscheppinge ende andere servituten oft gerieven beijde de 
huijsen respectivelijck dienende, blijven gelijckse voor oft ten tijde van de splijtinge ende 
vercoopinge geweest hebben, ende worden in sulckenen cas verstaen tacite bekent, verleden 
oft geconstitueert te sijn, ten waere daerinne anders bij partije waere versien.’
76 Lulius, et al., Rechtsgeleerde Observatien, derde deel, nr. 58, p. 164.
77 ‘Art. xi van de ordonnantie (…) van Erf-scheydinge ende Servituyten’, in: Coustumen, statuten, 
privilegien ende ordonnantien der stad Vlissingen (Paynaar & Corbelyn, 1765), p. 45: ‘Ende soo 
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used it’ led to the purchaser acquiring an encumbered estate. The parties could 
agree that no implied servitudes would be created.
Interpreting Grotius’s Position on Implied Servitudes
Grotius’s Introduction to Dutch Jurisprudence was published in 1631, three years 
after the introduction of the provisions on implied servitudes in the local laws 
of Vlissingen (1628).78 The Introduction ‘is a work of masterly systematisation, a 
condensed summary of existing laws (…)’, as R.W. Lee put it in 1930.79
In the paragraph on the obligations of a seller, Grotius noted that a seller is 
bound to deliver a property free from servitudes (vrij van alle dienstbaerheden):80
Under warranting is also understood freeing: for the seller must deliver 
to the purchaser the thing sold free of all servitudes, or otherwise he is 
bound to make compensation as far as the purchaser is affected thereby, 
the purchase still remaining intact (…).81
wanneer een eyghenaer van twee Huysen ende Erven, een van dien, ofte een deel daar af 
vercoopt simpelyck, ofte met zyn ghevolgd ende toe-behoorten, ghelyck (ofte met sulcke 
vryheden ende servituyten) een sulke dat beseten ende ghebruyckt heeft, ofte diergelyke 
clausulen ende woorden, moeten de Water-loopen, Doorganghen, Licht-scheppinghen, 
ende andere dierghelycke ghebruycken ofte commoditeyten blyven, ende voorts gebruyckt 
werden, gelycke voor ende ten tyde vande splissinge ende vercoopinge geweest hebben, 
ende worden in sulcken cas verstaen de voorsz: servituyten stilswyghende gheconstitueert 
te zyn, ten ware daer in anders by partye ware voorsien, ende sal ’t gunt voorsz: is mede 
plaetse hebben in twee huysen, die by den erf-genamen ofte successeurs van den besitter, 
simpelyck, ofte met de voorsz: woorden worden ghecavelt.’
78 See for the preparatory process of the Inleidinge: R. Fruin, ‘Hugo de Groot’s Inleidinge tot 
de Hollandsche Rechts-geleerdheid’, in: Robert Fruin’s Verspreide Geschriften, ed. by P.J. 
Blok, P.L. Muller & S. Muller, Deel viii (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1903), pp. 10–31; R. 
W. Lee, ‘The Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Holland (Inleiding tot de Hollandsche 
RechtsGeleertheyd) of Hugo Grotius’, Transactions of the Grotius Society, 16 (1930), 29–40; 
K. Wellschmied, ‘Zur Inleidinge Tot de Hollandsche Rechts-Geleerdheid des Hugo Grotius’, 
Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, 20 (1952), 389–440.
79 R.W. Lee, ‘The Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Holland (Inleiding tot de Hollandsche 
RechtsGeleertheyd) of Hugo Grotius’, Transactions of the Grotius Society, 16 (1930), 29–40 
(pp. 37–8).
80 Hugo de Groot, Inleydinge tot de Hollandsche Regts-geleertheyt (with notes of Simon van 
Groenewegen van der Made) (Delft: Bon, 1657), 3.15.5, p. 276. In his construction of natural 
law and in interpreting Grotius, Pufendorf emphasised that if a seller wanted to reserve a 
right in the sold property, he needed to do so expressly, cf. Samuel von Pufendorf, De iure 
naturae et gentium, iv.9.4 (Frankfurt: Knochio-Eslingeriana, 1759), p. 595.
81 ‘Onder waeren is oock het vrijen begrepen: want den verkooper moet de verkochte saeck 
den kooper leveren vrij van alle dienstbaerheden, ofte andersints is ghehouden te vergoeden 
’t gunt den kooper daer aen was gheleghen, blijvende den koop voorts in haer geheel (…)’.
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If the property was encumbered with a servitude, the seller was obligated to 
compensate the purchaser (ghehouden te vergoeden ’t gunt den kooper daer aen 
was gheleghen).82 Perhaps paragraph 2.36.6 was an exception to this general 
rule:
So, when the full owner of two houses has used the one house with some 
entitlement to the other house, and afterwards the houses are divided 
in ownership by transfer, without any mention either the one way or the 
other, then each house will keep its advantageous and disadvantageous 
entitlements as before.83
Van Leeuwen and Van der Keessel have argued that Grotius’s opinion was lim-
ited to cases where a servitude was lost by a merger (confusio) in the past.84 
If the owner of a dominant estate became the owner of the servient estate 
(and vice versa) the servitude was extinguished by confusio. According to Van 
Leeuwen and Van der Keessel, Grotius had meant that the former servitude 
revived if the owner sold one of the houses to someone else. Groenewegen 
van der Made seems to have had the same interpretation of Grotius since he 
referred to Roman texts on the merger and revival of servitudes.85 In his com-
mentary on Grotius’s Introduction, Schorer also related Grotius’s opinion to the 
revival of servitudes that had been lost by a merger. Schorer argued that servi-
tudes were lost by a merger if the parties intended the servient and dominant 
estate to remain in the hands of one owner. If the owner of a dominant estate 
only acquired ownership of a servient estate for a limited time, Schorer stated 
82 See Consultatien, advisen en advertissementen, gegeven en geschreven by verscheyden 
treffelijcke rechtsgeleerden in Holland en elders (Rotterdam: Naeranus, 1645), ii, nr. 122; 
W. Schorer/J.E. Austen, Aanteekeningen van Mr. Willem Schorer, over de Inleidinge tot de 
Hollandsche Rechts-Geleerdheid van Hugo de Groot (Amsterdam: Yntema, 1797), tweede stuk, 
p. 511.
83 De Groot, Inleiding tot de Hollandsche Rechts-geleertheyd, 2.36.6, p. 86: ‘Zoo wanneer een 
vollen eigenaer van twee huizen het eene huis heeft ghebruict met eenige gherechtigheid 
over het andere huis: ende daer nae door opdracht de huizen in eigendom werden 
gescheiden, zonder iet uit ofte in te zegghen, zoo behoud yeder huis zijne voordeelighe ende 
nadeelige gerechtigheden zulcs als te vooren.’
84 Van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis, 2.14.8, p. 127; Van der Keessel, Voorlesinge oor die hedendaagse 
reg, p. 157.
85 Dig. 8.4.9 (Pomponius 10 ad Sabinum), Dig. 8.1.18 (Paulus 31 quaestionum Papiniani), and Dig. 
18.4.2.19 (Ulpianus 49 ad Sabinum). On the other hand, Groenewegen van der Made stated 
that Grotius’s approach was corroborated by the laws of Rotterdam. See: De Groot 1657, 
p. 172, n. 8. Remarkably, Groenewegen van der Made did not discuss the implied grant of 
servitudes in his Tractatus de legibus abrogatis et inusitatis in Hollandia vicinisque regionibus 
(Leiden: Franciscum Moyardum et Davidem Lopez de Haro, 1649).
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that ‘the benefit of the servitude was only suspended for as long as that time 
had lasted’.86
Several different early modern scholars have discussed Grotius’s opinion 
on servitudes as a matter of interpretation of the iusta causa.87 Voet rejected 
Grotius’s opinion and considered to be on par with Bartolus’s approach on 
implied servitudes. He wrote ‘confer’ after Grotius’s opinion and referred to 
the aforementioned case of the Sacrum Consilium of Naples and treatise of 
Bartolomeo Cepolla (§5).88 Unfortunately, he did not elaborate on the extent 
of the similarity between Bartolus’s approach and that of Grotius’s. Voet 
explained that the Roman jurists were only willing to accept the express res-
ervation of a servitude by the seller, or the implied reservation, if a seller had 
sold his properties ‘as they are’ at the time of the sale.89 Voet adhered to the 
general Roman rule for the creation of servitudes and seemed reluctant to 
accept the various exceptions to the general rule that early modern scholars 
had distilled from Roman law. Voet’s disagreement with Grotius seems to have 
been unconnected to their disagreement over whether the creation of a servi-
tude required a quasi-delivery before a local court.90 At no point did Voet refer 
to how Grotius’s approach (or his own) related to the required quasi-delivery.
At the end of the eighteenth century, Didericus Lulius, Pieter and Reinier 
van Spaan, and Joannes van der Linden briefly discussed Grotius’s approach. 
They preferred his opinion over Voet’s as they argued that Grotius’s opinion was 
corroborated by the local laws of the Middelburg, Vlissingen, Schoonhoven, 
and Dordrecht.91 In these cities, the interpretation of the clause ‘just as the 
seller had possessed or used it’ led to the purchaser acquiring an encum-
bered estate.92 Apparently, these scholars believed that Grotius’s opinion was 
86 W. Schorer, J.E. Austen, Aanteekeningen van Mr. Willem Schorer, over de Inleidinge tot de 
Hollandsche Rechts-Geleerdheid van Hugo de Groot (Amsterdam: Yntema, 1797), eerste 
stuk, p. 309: ‘het genot der dienstbaarheid slechts zoo lang opgschord, tot dat die tijd 
overstreken is.’
87 Gerard van Wassenaer, Praxis Iudicaria, in twee onderscheyde deelen vervat, Practyk notariael 
(Amsterdam: Boom, 1696), eerste deel, cap. xii, nr. 10, p. 94; Voet, Commentarius ad 
Pandectas, ad Dig. 19.1.6; Lee interpreted Grotius in the same way. See: Lee, An Introduction to 
Roman-Dutch Law, p. 174.
88 M. de Afflictis, Decisiones sacri Consilii Neapolitani, dec. 298, p. 237 verso; Bartolomeo 
Cepolla, Urb. Praedior. Tract. I, cap. 38, nr. iv, in: Trattato delle servitù prediali sì urbane che 
rustiche di Bartolomeo Cipolla, p. 340.
89 Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, ad Dig. 8.6.3 and ad Dig. 19.1.6. Voet’s approach was 
adopted in Salmon v Lamb’s Executor & Naidoo 1906 edc 351. See also Lee, An Introduction to 
Roman-Dutch Law, p. 174.
90 See above § The (re)creation and merger of servitudes in Roman law.
91 Lulius, et al., Rechtsgeleerde Observatien, derde deel, nr. 58, p. 164.
92 See above § Bartolus’s influence on early modern local laws.
destinatione patris familias
Grotiana 42 (2021) 83-109
102
a matter of interpretation of the iusta causa and that the creation was not 
restricted to the revival of lost servitudes.93 They did not, however, elaborate 
on the meaning or origin of Grotius’s position.
In the South African case, Salmon v Lamb’s Executor & Naidoo (1906), judge 
Kotzé paid considerable attention to the interpretation of Grotius.94 Kotzé 
remarked that the passage ‘seems capable of a twofold meaning’.95 The first 
meaning is that Grotius referred ‘to the case of a person who as owner has 
built two adjoining houses or has purchased them, and during his ownership 
has so arranged that the one home is made subject to a burden in favour of 
the other.’96 The second and, according to Kotzé, the ‘generally-received inter-
pretation’, is that the owner of a dominant or servient estate ‘acquired the 
other, whether servient or dominant and so continued to enjoy the benefit of 
the privilege of servitude which the one house previously possessed over the 
other’.97 The subsequent transfer of one of the estates then led to the revival of 
the old servitude. Kotzé then mentioned the legal scholars who adopted this 
second interpretation, such as Wassenaar, Van Streyen, and Van Leeuwen.98 
Kotzé remarked: ‘As I have already stated, Grotius throughout his Introduction 
does not refer to any authorities in support of his text, and no commentator 
who has followed him has cited any general law or general custom, nor any 
decision of the Dutch courts in support of his statement.’99 Kotzé dismissed 
the meaning of the abovementioned local laws that corroborated Grotius’s 
opinion as he deemed them ‘purely local in their nature and operation’ and 
not ‘declaratory of the general law of the land.’100 Kotzé remarked:
Had the authors of the Rechtsgeleerde Observatien cited a general statute 
or placaat, or a decision of either the Court or the Supreme Court of Hol-
land, agreeing with the statement of Grotius, or a general Dutch custom 
to the same effect, the case would have been very different. (…) As there 
exists no general law or custom, nor any decision of the Dutch courts to 
93 Lulius, et al., Rechtsgeleerde Observatien, derde deel, nr. 58, p. 164. It is worth noting that 
Van der Linden was a pupil of Van der Keessel and must have known Van der Keessel’s 
interpretation of Grotius. Van der Linden excluded the implied grant of servitudes in his 
draft for a Dutch civil code. See: Second book, sixth title, first chapter, article 46, in: J. Th. 
de Smidt, Ontwerp Burgerlijk Wetboek 1807–1808 (Amsterdam: Graphic, 1967), p. 141.
94 Salmon v Lamb’s Executor & Naidoo 1906 edc 351–75.
95 Salmon v Lamb’s Executor & Naidoo 1906 edc 363.
96 Salmon v Lamb’s Executor & Naidoo 1906 edc 363.
97 Salmon v Lamb’s Executor & Naidoo 1906 edc 363.
98 Salmon v Lamb’s Executor & Naidoo 1906 edc 364–70.
99 Salmon v Lamb’s Executor & Naidoo 1906 edc 370.
100 Salmon v Lamb’s Executor & Naidoo 1906 edc 370.
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indicate that, the rule of the Roman law has been departed from, there 
can be no reason why we should not follow it.101
Kotzé reluctantly concluded that Voet’s position was the correct statement of 
Dutch law and held that the creation of servitudes in South Africa required 
an express grant. Unfortunately, Kotzé overlooked Voet’s observation that 
Grotius’s position was comparable to Bartolus’s and the fact that the above-
mentioned local laws progressed from Bartolus’s approach to implied servi-
tudes. Since Bartolus’s approach is an interpretation of Roman law, it can be 
argued that these local laws did not depart from Roman law.
In my opinion, Voet’s observation that Grotius’s position was comparable 
to Bartolus’s was right, and I will now elaborate on this. During the years that 
Grotius worked on his Introduction, he had access to, amongst other things, 
Bartolus’s commentaries on the Digest and the published customary laws of 
Antwerp.102 Looking at Grotius’s position on servitudes, it is hard to avoid the 
impression that Grotius had progressed from Bartolus’s approach to implied 
servitudes, despite the fact that Grotius did not mention whether or not it was 
a matter of interpretation or that the servitude needed to have a continuous 
and permanent cause, or that it had to be visible.
Grotius’s choice of words suggests he was familiar with the learned law 
approach to implied servitudes. The key fragment on implied servitudes, Dig. 
8.2.10 (Marcellus 4 digestorum), started with the words ‘two houses (binas 
aedes)’.103 Medieval comments on this text stressed that parties needed to cre-
ate servitudes expressly and that there was some room for the wider interpre-
tation of legacies. Grotius’s wording also echoed Bartolus’s approach. In the 
key text discussed by Bartolus, Julian mentioned ‘two shops (duas tabernas)’ 
and the legacy of one of them.104 Grotius also discussed two houses and the 
transfer of one of them. Furthermore, Grotius’s wording is almost identical to 
the provisions on implied servitudes in Antwerp’s Consuetudines compilatae of 
1608 and the Middelburg Ordinance of December 19th 1617 (§7).
There is another reason why it is not very likely that Grotius’s opinion was 
restricted to the revival of former servitudes, as Van der Linden and Van der 
101 Salmon v Lamb’s Executor & Naidoo 1906 edc 371–2.
102 Wellschmied, ‘Zur Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-Geleerdheid des Hugo Grotius’, 
pp. 413 and 405.
103 See Glosse Quaeri apud Dig. 8.2.10 (Marcellus 4 digestorum) Binas aedes; Angelus de 
Perusio, Lectura super prima parte Digesti Veteris, ad Dig. 8.2.10 (Marcellus 4 digestorum) 
Binas Aedes, 185 verso.
104 Dig. 33.3.1 (Julianus 1 ex Minicio): ‘Qui duas tabernas coniunctas habebat, eas singulas 
duobus legavit.’
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Keessel have argued. Roman jurists often discussed the revival of servitudes 
in one breath with the extinction of servitudes. Grotius did not discuss the 
implied grant of servitudes within the context of a merger. He inserted it into 
the paragraph on the creation of servitudes.
Grotius did not mention whether or not his opinion on servitudes was a 
matter of interpretation. He even added the words, ‘without any mention 
either the one way or the other (‘zonder iets uit ofte in te zeggen’)’, which suggest 
that the parties’ silence sufficed. In one of his other books, De iure belli ac pacis 
libri tres, Grotius paid quite a bit of attention to interpretation.105 The chapter 
de Interpretatione concerned the interpretation of laws and treaties, but many 
parts are equally applicable to the interpretation of contracts between two pri-
vate parties. Grotius wrote:
Where we have no other conjecture to guide us, words are not to be strict-
ly taken in their original or grammatical sense, but in their common ac-
ceptation, for it is the arbitrary will of custom, which directs the laws and 
rules of speech.106
Grotius’s Influence on the Implied Grant of Servitudes in the 
Netherlands
After the publication of Grotius’s Inleiding, several different cities expressly 
adopted the implied grant of servitudes in their published local laws, such as 
Rotterdam (1654), Schoonhoven (1644), and Dordrecht (1725).107 These cities 
did, however, expressly consider the implied creation to be the result of the 
interpretation of specific clauses in the contract. This means that these pro-
visions are more similar in wording to the local provisions of Antwerp (1582), 
Middelburg (1617), and Flushing (1628) than to that of Grotius’s Inleiding (1631). 
Grotius may have paved the way for Rotterdam, Schoonhoven, and Dordrecht, 
but this influence on these local provisions cannot be proven.
105 Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis libri tres, ii, 16.
106 2.16.2: ‘Si nulla sit conjectura quae ducat alio, verba intelligenda sunt ex proprietate, non 
Grammatica quae est ex origine, sed populari ex usu, “Quem penes arbitrium est, & jus & 
norma loquendi” ’. Translation by A.C. Campbell and D.J. Hill, The Rights of War and Peace 
(New York: Walter Dunne, 1901).
107 Art. 16 van de Keure en Ordonnantie op het stuck van de Reede ende Erf-Scheydinge en 
Servituyten voor den Gerechte der Stadt Rotterdam (10 april 1654), in: C. Cau, Groot Placaet-
Boeck (’s-Gravenhage: Van Wouw, 1705), iv, fol. 488. Cf. Lulius, et al., Rechtsgeleerde 
Observatien, derde deel, nr. 58, p. 164.
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Apart from these cities, some reluctance to accept the implied grant of ser-
vitudes remained. The well-known collection of legal opinions entitled the 
Consultatien, Advysen en Advertissementen gegeven ende geschreven by ver-
scheijden Treffelijke Rechtsgeleerden in Hollant en elders (commonly known as 
the Hollandsche Consultatien), provides an example of this reluctance.
In 1644, a purchaser of a house contested the implied grant of a servitude.108 
Before the transfer, the seller had been the owner of two neighbouring houses. 
One of the houses discharged rainwater from its roof onto the roof of the other 
house. The seller sold the ‘servient’ house with the clause ‘that the sold house 
would be accepted with such servitudes as it was encumbered with’.109 After 
the transfer, the seller, who was still the owner of the ‘dominant’ house, argued 
that a servitude for the drainage of rainwater and run-off had been created. 
In his opinion of this case, the jurist Moons dismissed the position of the 
seller. Moons argued that the owner of two houses could not effectively create 
a servitude in one house in favour of the other house. According to Moons, 
the aforementioned clause only constituted an exoneration in the sense that 
the seller was not liable for any servitudes with which the house may have 
been encumbered. It did not qualify as the reservation of a servitude. Moons 
emphasized that the reservation of a servitude needed to be made ‘expressly 
and specifically’.110
The Supreme Court of Holland, Zeeland, and West-Friesland was less reluc-
tant to accept the implied grant of servitudes. In 1709, it had to decide whether 
a contractual clause entailed the implied reservation of a servitude. Earlier, in 
1641, the owner of the dominant estate had acquired ownership of the servi-
ent estate. After thirty years, he sold both estates to two different purchasers. 
The seller sold the former servient estate ‘on all the conditions, on which he 
had purchased it himself (op al de conditiën, waarop hij het zelf had gekocht)’. 
Subsequently, the purchaser blocked the owner of the other estate from exer-
cising his servitude (water loop).
The Supreme Court formulated the general rule that a servitude that was 
lost by confusio did not automatically revive after one of the estates was trans-
ferred.111 The seller needed to reserve a servitude, if the parties desired the 
revival of a lost servitude. In his private account of the case, Justice Cornelis 
108 Consultatien, advisen en advertissementen, gegeven en geschreven by verscheyden treffelijcke 
rechtsgeleerden in Holland en elders (Rotterdam: Naeranus, 1645), ii, nr. 145, p. 289.
109 Ibid, p. 289.
110 Ibid, p. 289; Van der Keessel, Voorlesinge oor die hedendaagse reg, p. 157.
111 C. van Bijnkershoek, Observationes Tumultuariae, I, nr. 482. Likewise H.J. Zoes, 
Commentarius ad digestorum seu pandectarum (Venice: Pezzana, 1757), ad Dig. 8.6, nr. 2, 
p. 304.
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van Bijnkershoek expressly referred to the abovementioned opinion by the 
Roman jurist Paul [Dig. 8.2.30 (Paulus 15 ad Sabinum)].112 The Supreme Court 
ruled that the interpretation of the cited clause implied the reservation of a 
servitude.
Unlike in France, the creation of servitudes by means of destinatione patris 
familias never really took off in the Dutch Republic. One of the reasons seems 
to be that the most prominent advocate of this approach in the Republic, 
Grotius, could have been more clear about the meaning of his position in the 
Inleiding to avoid confusion and misinterpretation.113 Moreover, I believe that 
Dutch legal practice was less inclined to recognise the implied grant because 
it was at odds with the publicity of real rights.114 In the Dutch Republic, a fairly 
adequate system of public registration of the transfer and encumbrances of 
immovable assets existed. In 1560, the Spanish king Phillip ii provided that all 
transfers and encumbrances regarding immovable assets be registered in the 
records of the local courts. He noted that abuse and inconveniences occurred 
with regard to the sale and encumbrances because of a lack of adequate reg-
istration. The required registration meant that a secretary of the Court tran-
scribed (a part of) the contents of the deed of a pledge in a publicly accessible 
register or record. The States of Holland maintained these rules on registration 
in the Politieke Ordonnantie of 1580.115 Publicity enabled prospective buyers to 
establish a person’s entitlement to the immovable assets and credit providers 
to assess a person’s creditworthiness.116 Interested parties had to look in mul-
tiple registers to establish whether or not assets were encumbered. However, 
they could also make use of the (paid) services offered by the city’s secretary to 
look up any encumbrances.117 Recent research suggests that the registers were 
112 Van Bijnkershoek also remarked that some legal scholars were of the opinion that the 
servitude was dormant after the confusio but before the transfer. This was also the opinion 
of the Schepenen of Dordrecht, the court of first instance in this case.
113 See also the abovementioned quote by judge Kotzé in Salmon v Lamb’s Executor & Naidoo 
1906 edc 371–2.
114 In the previous paragraph, I mentioned that Voet’s disagreement with Grotius seems to 
have been unconnected to their disagreement over whether the creation of a servitude 
required a quasi-delivery before a local court. At no point did Voet point to how Grotius’s 
approach (or his own) on implied servitudes related to the required quasi-delivery.
115 See S. 37 of the Politieke Ordonnantie van de Staten van Holland van 1580.
116 See also O. Gelderblom, M. Hup, and J. Jonker, ‘Public Functions, Private Markets: Credit 
Registration by Aldermen and Notaries in the Low Countries, 1500–1800’, in: Financing 
in Europe, Palgrave Studies in the History of Finance, ed. by M. Lorenzini et al. (Cham: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 163–94, at p. 183.
117 See the announcement in Amsterdamsche secretary, bestaande in formulieren van 
scheepenen- kennissen, quytscheldingen, schatbrieven en ander die gewoonlyk daar gebruikt 
worden.(Amsterdam: Bos, 1737), p. 316.
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consulted frequently.118 If servitudes could be created by means of an implied 
grant, third parties could be unaware of such an encumbrance when they 
inspected the public register. In the Kingdom of France, on the other hand, 
publicity of transfers and encumbrances of immovable assets was lacking. A 
lack of public registration of (implied) servitudes was less problematic since 
third parties were unable to inspect public records for transfers and encum-
brances anyway. The requirement that the implied servitudes needed to have a 
continuous and permanent cause was an alternative way to achieve publicity.
The implied grant of servitudes was eventually adopted in all of Holland (and 
the rest of the Netherlands). In 1810, the French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte 
annexed the Kingdom of Holland, the successor of the Batavian (and before 
that Dutch) Republic. In 1811, he introduced the French civil code of 1804, and 
it combined the various customary French approaches to implied servitudes. 
Article 692 provided: the designated use by the head of the family equals title 
for continuous and apparent servitudes.119 If a seller transferred an estate with 
a visible sign of servitude (‘un signe apparent de servitude’), a servitude was cre-
ated, even if the parties had made no mention of a servitude.120 After the defeat 
of Napoleon, the Low Countries regained their independence and strived to 
introduce their own civil code. The Dutch civil code of 1838 contained a nearly 
literal translation of the French provisions on implied servitudes.121 Neither 
Bartolus’s nor Grotius’s position on implied servitudes was discussed in the 
creation of the civil code. The French way to create implied servitudes, how-
ever, was never fully embraced by legal scholars in the Netherlands because it 
was at odds with publicity.122 This explains why it was not included in the new 
Dutch civil code of 1992.123 Again, neither Bartolus’s nor Grotius’s position on 
implied servitudes was discussed in the creation of this civil code.
118 C. van Bochove, H. Deweneth, and J. Zuijderduijn, ‘Real Estate and Mortgage Finance in 
England and the Low Countries, 1300–1800’, Continuity and Change 30/1 (2015), 9–38, at 
pp. 15–20.
119 ‘La destination du père de famille vaut titre à l’égard des servitudes continues et 
apparentes’.
120 Art. 694 Cc.
121 Art. 747 and 748 of the Dutch civil code of 1838.
122 See also N.K.F. Land, Verklaring van het Burgerlijk Wetboek (Haarlem: Erven Bohn, 1901), p. 
299 fn 3.
123 Parl. Gesch. bw Boek 5 (zakelijke rechten) 1981, p. 262. See also art. 5.6.3. O.M.; V.J.M. van 
Hoof, ‘Het voortbestaan van erfdienstbaarheden na vermenging’, WPNR (Weekblad voor 
privaatrecht, notariaat en registratie), 7265 (2020), 6–16 (pp. 15–6).
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Conclusion
One of the book chests in which Hugo de Groot escaped from Loevestein cas-
tle was previously used to deliver the sources that Hugo de Groot used for 
writing the Inleiding tot de Hollandsche Rechts-geleerdheid. Bartolus’s com-
mentaries on the Digest, the published customary laws of Antwerp, and vari-
ous other legal sources enabled Grotius to formulate his position on implied 
servitudes. According to Grotius (2.36.6), the actual use of two houses by the 
same owner could lead to the implied grant of a servitude, if he transferred 
one of the houses to someone else, ‘without any mention either the one way 
or the other’.
The ‘generally-received interpretation’124 that the implied grant was 
restricted to the revival of servitudes that were lost by confusio, is unfounded. 
However, as Voet suggested, Grotius most likely progressed from Bartolus’s 
approach to implied servitudes and the local laws in the Low Countries that it 
influenced. According to Bartolus, a servitude was implied if there was doubt 
about the meaning of the parties and the servitude had a continuous and per-
manent cause (causam continuam et permanentem). The local laws of Antwerp 
and Middelburg expressly recognised the implied grant of servitudes that had a 
continuous and permanent cause, such as watercourses and passages. Grotius 
had access to these sources, and his choice of words echoed these local laws 
and the key texts from the Digest on implied servitudes that were discussed 
by Bartolus. Grotius did not mention whether the implied grant was restricted 
to servitudes that had a continuous and permanent cause. However, as the 
Inleiding was a condensed summary of existing laws, it is unlikely that Grotius 
formulated a new rule for the implied creation of servitudes that deviated from 
the ius commune and customary law.
Unlike in France (and many other European countries), the creation of ser-
vitudes by means of destinatione patris familias never really took off in the 
Dutch Republic. One of the reasons seems to be that Grotius, as the most 
prominent advocate of this approach in the Republic, could have been more 
clear about the meaning of his position in the Inleiding to avoid confusion and 
misinterpretation. Moreover, Dutch legal practice and scholarship were less 
inclined to recognise the implied grant because it was at odds with the pub-
licity of real rights. In the Dutch Republic, a fairly adequate system of public 
registration of the transfer and encumbrances of immovable assets existed. If 
servitudes could be created by means of an implied grant, third parties could 
124 Salmon v Lamb’s Executor & Naidoo 1906 edc 363.
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be unaware of such an encumbrance when they inspected the public register. 
Even after the French code civil was introduced, the implied servitude was 
never fully embraced by legal scholars in the Netherlands because it was at 
odds with publicity. This explains why it was not included in the new Dutch 
civil code of 1992.
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